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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

vs.

:

JASON B. PARKIN,

:

Appellate Case No. 20060530-CA

:

Trial Court Case No. 041500254FS

Defendant/Appellate.

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (2004).
On May 3,2006, Appellant was convicted pursuant to a conditional plea agreement by
the Honorable Bruce Lubeck, Third District Court, Summit County, State of Utah of
possession of a controlled substance, to wit, cocaine, a third degree felony, in violation of
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(b)(ii). (R. 118-20). Copies of the judgment and the Order
denying Appellant's Motion to Suppress and Memorandum in Support are in Addendum
A.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES. STANDARD OF REVIEW. PRESERVATION
Issue 1: Whether the trial court erred by failing to find whether Mr. Parkin was in
custody and interrogated for Miranda purposes without the procedural protection of a
Miranda warning?

Standard of review: "A trial court's application of the legal concept of custodial
interrogation to the facts of a particular case presents a mixed question of fact and law."
State v. Levin, — P.3d —, 2006 UT 50, %4 (Utah 2006). Questions implicating Fifth
Amendment Miranda protections are reviewed for correctness." Id. at f 45.
Preservation: The Miranda issue was preserved by Mr. Parkin's Motion to
Suppress and during the suppression hearing on the matter. (R. 41-6, 48-9). Moreover,
the trial court made findings of fact consistent with findings to determine whether
Spencer was subject to a custodial interrogation. (R. 79-86).
Issue 2: Whether the trial court committed plain error by failing to find whether
Mr. Parkin was in custody and interrogated for Miranda purposes without the procedural
protection of a Miranda warning?
Standard of review: "Plain error is a question of law reviewed for correctness."
State v. Smit, 2004 UT App 222,1f 7, 95 P.3d 1203 (Utah Ct. App. 2004).
Preservation: Should this Court find that Appellant did not sufficiently preserve
the Miranda issue for appeal, this Court should hear it based on the plain error doctrine.
See State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208-09 (Utah 1993) (concluding that plain error
standard of review applies to issues not preserved for appeal); State v. Saunders, 992 P.2d
951, 1999 UT 59, U 30 (Utah 1999) (court will consider plain error on appeal).
Issue 3: Whether the trial court erred by finding that Appellant's consent was
freely and voluntarily given without coercion?

Standard of review: In reviewing a denial of a motion to suppress, the trial court's
conclusions of law are reviewed for correctness and its factual findings are reviewed for
clear error. State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936-939, n.4 (Utah 1994); State v. Veteto, 6 P.3d
1133,1135,2000 UT 62, H 8 (Utah 2000).
Preservation. The Conditional Plea Agreement specifically reserved the
Appellant's right to appeal the District Court's denial of his pretrial Motion to Suppress.
See State v. Seary, 758 P.2d 935, 939 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). This issue was also
preserved below at a suppression hearing held on August 22, 2005 (R. 41-46) and by
written motions filed on August 15, 2005, and December 6,2005. (R. 48-49, 65-75).
Issue 4: Whether the trial court erred by failing to rule on whether exigent
circumstances existed to justify Spencer's warrantless search?
Standard of Review: "The determination of whether exigent circumstances existed
is a question of fact, which should not be disturbed on appeal unless clearly erroneous."
State v. Morck, 821 P.2d 1190,1194 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (citing State v. Ashe, 745 P.3d
1255, 1258 (Utah 1987)).
Preservation: This state constitutional issue was preserved in Appellant's Motion
to Suppress and Appellant's Reply Memorandum. (R. 41-6, 65-75). It was also
preserved during oral argument. (R.77-78). During oral argument ("OA") defense
counsel argued, "[Under] Utah law [ ] a warrantless automobile search requires probable
cause and exigent circumstances. .. Now there was absolutely no testimony of any
exigent circumstances, quite the contrary." (OA: 58).

TEXT OF RELEVANT STATUTES. RULES
AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
The text of the following statutes, rules and constitutional provisions is in
Addendum B:
Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 14;
United States Constitution, Amendment IV;
United States Constitution, Amendment V;
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The state filed an Information on December 17, 2004, charging
Appellant/Defendant Jason B. Parkin ("Parkin" or "Appellant") with one count of
possession of marijuana, a class A misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-378(2)(b)(ii); one count of possession of drug paraphernalia, a class A misdemeanor, in
violation of § 58-37a-5; and one count of possession of a controlled substance, to wit,
cocaine, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(b)(ii) (2004).
(R. 3-5). A preliminary hearing was held on May 3, 2005, and the case was bound over.
(R. 27-28). On August 15, 2005, Appellant filed a Motion to Suppress and Memorandum
in Support. (R. 41-46). A suppression hearing was conducted on August 22, 2005. (R.
48-49). On November 9, 2005, the state filed its Memorandum in Opposition to the
Defendant's Motion to Suppress. (R. 58-64). On December 6, 2005, Appellant filed his
Reply Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion to Suppress. (R. 65-75). Oral
argument was heard on December 13, 2005, and the court took the matter under
advisement. (R. 77-78). On December 14, 2005, the Honorable Bruce Lubeck issued an
Order denying Appellant's Motion to Suppress. (R. 79-86).
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On March 21, 2006, Appellant pled guilty to possession of a controlled substance,
to wit, cocaine, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(b)(ii)
(2004). (R. 102-12). The Honorable Bruce Lubeck, Third District Court, Summit
County, State of Utah entered a judgment for Appellant's conviction of Possession of a
Controlled Substance, to wit cocaine, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code
Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(b)(ii) on May 3, 2006. (R. 118-20). Appellant received a sentence of
zero to five (5) years at the Utah State Prison. The sentence was stayed upon twenty-four
(24) months probation with Adult Probation and Parole. (R. 114-17). Appellant filed a
timely notice of appeal on June 1, 2006. (R. 121-22).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
According to testimony taken at a suppression hearing ("SH") on or about
December 6, 2004, Trooper Seth Spencer ("Spencer") of the Utah Highway Patrol
testified that at approximately 6:30 p.m. he arrived at the scene of a traffic accident that
had occurred on SR-248 on Sidewinder Drive, Park City, Utah. (SH:15). There were
two vehicles involved in the accident. Id. The vehicles had stopped off of the highway
in the private parking lot of the Aspen Villa Apartments. (SH:27). Mr. Parkin was the
complainant and driver of one of the vehicles. (SH: 15). Spencer testified that he first
made contact with Mr. Parkin outside of his vehicle and detected the odor of marijuana
coming from his person. (SH:16). He did not, however, inquire about the odor at that
time. Id. Spencer did observe Mr. Parkin walking around for thirty minutes. (SH:37).
Mr. Parkin did not have glassy, blood shot eyes. Id. He did not appear to be slurring his
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words. Id. And he did not appear to be impaired in any manner. Id. Based on those
observations Spencer did not believe Mr. Parkin was driving impaired, therefore he did
not investigate into any D.U.I, violation. Id.
As part of the accident investigation Spencer collected information from both
drivers including their drivers license, registration, and insurance information. (SH:17).
His investigation lasted approximately thirty minutes. Id. At the conclusion of his
investigation Spencer cited the other driver and did not cite Mr. Parkin for any moving or
equipment violation. (SH:17-18). At that time Spencer returned the culpable party's
driver license, registration, citation, and insurance information before they left the scene.
(SH:31).
Next, Spencer requested Mr. Parkin to sit in his patrol car so that he could obtain
some more information, such as the speed he was traveling pre and post impact, and so
that he could print off all necessary information regarding the accident and the other
driver's insurance information for Mr. Parkin. (SH: 18-19). Spencer testified that he
again detected the odor of marijuana as Mr. Parkin sat in his patrol car. (SH:19). He
continued to obtain information from Mr. Parkin and then concluded the accident
investigation. Id.
Immediately after concluding the accident investigation Spencer questioned Mr.
Parkin about the odor of marijuana. Id. Mr. Parkin was still inside of the patrol car and
Spencer retained his driver's license. (SH: 19, 21). Spencer testified that his overhead
lights were flashing, he was in uniform, had a side arm but did not unholster it, nor did he
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pull out his handcuffs or threaten Mr. Parkin. (SH: 19-20). Spencer told Mr. Parkin that
he could smell marijuana on his person. (SH:35). Then, Spencer specifically asked Mr.
Parkin whether "he had smoked any marijuana that day, or if he had been around
anybody that had smoked marijuana that day." (SH:20,35). According to Spencer, Mr.
Parkin responded that "he does have friends that smoke marijuana, [and] that he had not
had any that day." Id.
While questioning Mr. Parkin, Spencer did not inform him that he was free to
leave, that he did not have to speak to him and that he did not have to consent to a search
of his vehicle. (SH:32-33). The entire conversation inside of the patrol car lasted
approximately ten minutes, including the conclusion of the accident investigation.
(SH:33). Spencer testified that he wanted to perform a search of Mr. Parkin's vehicle
based on the odor of marijuana, he stated, "[A]ny time I smell marijuana, I search the
car." (SH:39). Based on the odor of marijuana and Mr. Parkin's denial to smoking,
Spencer asked for Mr. Parkin's consent to the search of his vehicle to "make sure there
wasn't any marijuana" in it. (SH:36). Mr. Parkin stated that "that would be fine with
him." Id.
Pursuant to the search of Mr. Parkin's vehicle Spencer discovered a small metal
pipe that he believed to be consistent with marijuana use and a "jerky chew" can
containing a green leafy substance which appeared to be marijuana. (SH:22). Spencer
testified that as part of his training he learned how to determine "[the] smell of both pre
burned and post burned marijuana, and the smoke while it is being burnt." (SH:44).
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After discovering the marijuana and consistent marijuana paraphernalia, Spencer placed
Mr. Parkin under arrest and called for backup to assist him in a more thorough search of
the vehicle. (SH:22). At approximately 7:30 p.m. Trooper Jorgenson ("Jorgenson") of
the Utah Highway Patrol was dispatched to the scene to assist Spencer in the search of
the vehicle and also to perform an inventory search. (SH:3,5,9). Pursuant to the search
Spencer and Jorgenson discovered bags of marijuana and a couple bags with white power
residue, later determined to be cocaine. (SH:5).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The trial court erred by failing to rule on whether a Miranda violation occurred.
The Fifth Amendment privilege against self incrimination provides that "no person . . .
shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself." U.S. Const,
amend. V. The United States Supreme Court held in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436,
492 (1966), that a defendant must be informed of his or her Fifth Amendment right
before being subject to a custodial interrogation.
First, a Miranda violation occurred where Mr. Parkin was in custody and
interrogated for Miranda purposes when he was questioned in Spencer's patrol car about
the odor of marijuana without the procedural protection of a Miranda warning. Mr.
Parkin was interrogated because Spencer asked questions that he knew were likely to
elicit an incriminating response. Mr. Parkin was also in custody while he was
interrogated. Several factors point towards custody including: that he was isolated in a
police car with an officer accusing him of a crime, Spencer's questioning was accusatory,
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there were no other people around, they were pulled off of the highway, and Mr. Parkin
was the sole suspect of the investigation. Because Mr. Parkin was in custody and
interrogated for Miranda purposes without a Miranda warning all statements he made
should have been suppressed. The Miranda issue was sufficiently preserved for appeal
therefore this Court should review it.
Second, even if this Court finds that the Miranda issue was not specifically
preserved for appeal this Court may still review it under the plain error doctrine because
Mr. Parkin can establish that an error exists, that the error should have been obvious to
the trial court, and that the error is harmful. See Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1208-09.
Third, the trial court erred by finding that Mr. Parkin's consent was voluntarily
and free of prior police illegality. Factors that lead to a conclusion of coercion include:
Spencer accusing Mr. Parkin of committing a crime while isolated in his patrol car
(SH:20,35); Spencer informing Mr. Parkin that he wanted to check the vehicle to make
sure there was no marijuana in it (SH:36); and Spencer telling Mr. Parkin that he could
smell marijuana on him (SH:36). Reviewing the totality of the circumstances, the trial
court erred when it found that Mr. Parkin's consent was clear and unequivocal. (R. 7986). Additionally, this Court should find that the consent was invalid and the evidence
should have been suppressed based on the prior police illegality, specifically the Miranda
violation.
Finally, the trial court erred by failing to rule on whether an exigent circumstance
existed. Under Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution, "[A] warrantless
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automobile search requires probable cause and exigent circumstances unless it satisfies
traditionally recognized justifications of protecting the safety of police or the public or
preventing the destruction of evidence." State v. Brake, 103 P.3d 699, 705, 2004 UT 95
(Utah 2004). "[EJxigent circumstances exist when the car is movable, the occupants are
alerted [to the presence of law enforcement], and the car's contents may never be found
again if a warrant must be obtained." State v. Anderson, 910 P.2d 1229, 1237 (Utah
1996) (citations omitted). There were no exigent circumstances in this case because
Spencer had ample time to obtain a search warrant or a telephonic warrant. Therefor, the
warrantless search of Mr. Parkin's vehicle absent exigent circumstances violated his
rights under Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY FAILING TO RULE ON
WHETHER MR. PARKIN WAS IN CUSTODY AND INTERROGATED
WITHOUT THE PROCEDURAL PROTECTION OF A MIRANDA WARNING.
A.

ALL STATEMENTS MADE TO SPENCER SHOULD HAVE
BEEN SUPPRESSED BECAUSE THEY WERE THE PRODUCT
OF CUSTODIAL INTERROGATION AND MR. PARKIN DID
NOT RECEIVE A MIRANDA WARNING.

The Fifth Amendment privilege against self incrimination provides that "no person
. . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself." U.S. Const.
amend. V. Police interrogation of a suspect in custody threatens the exercise of this Fifth
Amendment privilege because of the potential danger that officers will compel
confessions through overtly coercive interrogations. NY. v. Quarels, 467 U.S. 649, 654
(1984). In Miranda, the United States Supreme Court held that unless the defendant was
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informed of his Fifth Amendment right before a custodial interrogation, any pretrial
statements elicited from the defendant were inadmissible at trial. 384 U.S. at 492. The
standard to determine whether a person is in custody for Miranda purposes is whether the
individual's "freedom of action is curtailed to a degree associated with formal arrest."
Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 440 (1984); see also State v. East, 743 P.2d 1211,
1212 (Utah 1987). Interrogation is defined as "any words or actions on the part of the
police that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating
response from the suspect." Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301 (1980).
Utah courts recognize four factors that must be evaluated to determine whether a
suspect is in custody for Miranda purposes, "(1) the site of the interrogation; (2) whether
the investigation focused on the accused; (3) whether objective indicia of arrest were
present; and (4) the length and form of interrogation." State v. Mirquet, 844 P.2d 995,
998 (Utah Ct App. 1992); Salt Lake City v. Carner, 664 P.2d 1168, 1171 (Utah 1983).
Moreover, in State v. Kelly, 718 P.2d 385, 391 (Utah 1986), the Utah Supreme Court
recognized that the officer's "coercive or compulsive strategy" should be assessed in
determining the interrogation factor of custody. The question of custody is determined
based on an objective standard. "[T]he only relevant inquiry is how a reasonable man in
the suspect's position would have understood his situation." Berkemer v. McCarty, 468
U.S. at 442.
Spencer interrogated Mr. Parkin for Miranda purposes when he asked questions
that were likely to elicit an incriminating response. Spencer testified that he told Mr.
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Parkin that he could smell marijuana on him. (SH:35). Then he asked if "he had smoked
any marijuana that day or if he had been around anybody that had smoked marijuana that
day." (SH:20). Spencer should have known that this would likely elicit an incriminating
response because he was accusing Mr. Parkin of smoking marijuana. Spencer also asked
if he could search Mr. Parkin's vehicle to make sure there was no marijuana in it.
(SH:36). This question is equally as likely to elicit an incriminating response because it
accuses Mr. Parkin of possessing an illegal substance in his vehicle.
Additionally, Mr. Parkin was in custody for purposes of Miranda at the time
Spencer began interrogating him. Utah case law recognizes that a temporary detention
with a limited purpose is not a custodial interrogation. Mirquet, 844 P.2d at 997.
However, "at the point the environment becomes custodial or accusatory, a police
officer's questions must be prefaced with a Miranda warning." Id. at 998. The Utah
Supreme Court has identified that investigative questioning turns accusatory when the
"police have reasonable grounds to believe that a crime has been committed and also
reasonable grounds to believe that the defendant has committed it." Carner, 664 P.2d at
1171.
The first Miranda factor, the site of the interrogation, strongly points toward
custody because Mr. Parkin was questioned inside of a patrol car by a uniformed officer
in a desolate parking lot. In Mirquet, this Court found that interrogation inside of a police
car points toward custody. 844 P.2d at 999. This Court stated that the site is not "as free
of compulsion as questioning on a sidewalk or outside of the police car." Id. And that
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because the defendant pulled alongside the interstate "[he] was thus subject to a more
police dominated setting than a citizen pulled over in an urban area where passing
motorists are going slower and pedestrians are present." Id. The present case is similar
to Mirquet because Mr. Parkin was questioned in a police car that was stopped off of the
highway in a parking lot. There is no evidence in the record that other people were
present or in the area. The evidence shows that the only other person at the scene, the
culpable party from the accident, had already left before Mr. Parkin was questioned in
Spencer's patrol car. (SH:31). Moreover, Spencer never told Mr. Parkin that he was free
to leave or that he did not have to speak with him any further. (SH:32).
The second factor, whether the investigation focused on the accused, likewise
supports a finding of custody because Spencer was not questioning Mr. Parkin as part of
a general inquiry into an unsolved crime; instead he was the only suspect of the
investigation.
The third factor, whether objective indicia of arrest were present, supports a
finding of custody because Mr. Parkin was isolated in a patrol car with a uniformed
officer accusing him of a crime. In Mirquet, this Court stated that". . . [the] defendant
was isolated in a patrol vehicle with an officer accusing him of a crime. One element of
any arrest is going to be such an accusation." 844 P.2d at 999. Likewise, Mr. Parkin was
insolated in a patrol car with Spencer accusing him of a crime. Although there was no
direct indicia of arrest such as handcuffs on the dashboard or a display of a gun,
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Spencer's direct accusation that Mr. Parkin smoked marijuana and had some in his
vehicle is sufficient indicia of arrest to constitute custody.
Finally, the fourth factor, the length and form of interrogation, strongly leads to a
conclusion of custody. In Mirquet, this Court held that the fourth factor strongly
supported the trial court's determination of custody because Sergeant Mangelson stated,
"[I]t's obvious to me that you've been smoking marijuana. Do you care to go get the
marijuana for me, or do you want me to find it?" 844 P.2d at 1000. It also found that,
Officer Mangelson testified that the moment he detected the aroma
of marijuana there was no question in his mind whatsoever that the
defendant had been smoking marijuana. At this point Officer
Mangelson had reasonable grounds to believe both a crime had been
committed and defendant had committed the crime. The questioning
that followed was an attempt to get evidence to support that
conclusion. The form of Officer Mangelson's question was not only
likely to elicit an incriminating response, it precluded any
nonincriminating response. This question manifested coercive
intent.
Id. Similarly, Spencer testified that he detected the odor of marijuana on Mr. Parkin
when he first made contact with him. (SH: 16). He also testified that "[A]ny time I smell
marijuana, I search the car." (SH:39). At the point that Spencer detected the odor of
marijuana on Mr. Parkin he had reasonable grounds to believe that a crime had been
committed and that Mr. Parkin had committed it. See Carrier, 664 P.2d at 1171. Spencer
questioned Mr. Parkin in attempt to get evidence in support of his belief that there was
marijuana in the vehicle. Spencer's testimony above indicates his coercive intent.
Therefore the form of questioning was accusatory and elicited an incriminating response.

14

Viewing these factors in their totality, a reasonable person in Mr. Parkin's position
would have believed that his or her freedom of action was curtailed to a degree associated
with formal arrest. Therefore, Mr. Parkin should have been provided a Miranda warning
because he was in custody and interrogated by Spencer. The U.S. Supreme Court
established the rule in Miranda specifically to prohibit this type of conscious disregard of
a constitutional guarantee by an officer. Because the trial court failed to rule on this
issue, Mr. Parkin asks this Court to decide the issue if presented with sufficient factual
findings; in the alternative, Mr. Parkin asks this Court to remand the case to the trial court
to rule on this issue and make the necessary findings and conclusions.
B.

THE MIRANDA ISSUE WAS PRESERVED IN THE TRIAL
COURT FOR APPEAL.

"A general rule of appellate review in criminal cases in Utah is that a
contemporaneous objection or some form of specific preservation of claims of error must
be made a part of the trial court record before an appellate court will review such claim
on appeal." State v. Johnson, 11A P.2d 1141, 1144 (Utah 1989) (quotations and citation
omitted). Additionally, "the grounds for the objection must be distinctly and specifically
stated." Id.
The Miranda issue was preserved in the trial court by Mr. Parkin's Motion to
Suppress and during the suppression hearing on the matter. (R. 41-6, 48-9). Moreover,
the trial court made findings of fact consistent with findings to determine whether a
custodial interrogation occurred. (R. 79-86).
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Questioning by defense counsel to Spencer on cross examination during the
suppression hearing supports a finding that the Miranda issue was preserved: whether his
overhead lights were continuously on during both the traffic accident and criminal
investigations; (SH:27) whether the culpable party to the accident had left the scene
before he questioned Mr. Parkin in his patrol car; (SH:31) whether he told Mr. Parkin that
he was free to leave; (SH:32) whether he told Mr. Parkin that he could smell marijuana
on him; (SH:35) and if he could look in Mr. Parkin's vehicle to make sure there was no
marijuana in it. (SH:36).
Questioning to Spencer posed by the state also supports a finding that the Miranda
issue was preserved: if he was dressed in his uniform; (SH:19) if he had a side arm on;
(SH:20) if he ever unholstered the side arm or threatened Mr. Parkin; (SH:20) if he pulled
out his handcuffs and put them on the dashboard or displayed them in any manner;
(SH:20); whether Mr. Parkin had smoked marijuana that day, or if he been with friends
that smoked marijuana; (SH:20) and whether he retained Mr. Parkin's drivers license
while he questioned him. (SH:21).
Moreover, the trial judge made the following findings of fact that are also
consistent with a finding that the issue was preserved for appeal.
2. Defendant's car was behind the other vehicle . . . and
Spencer was behind both vehicles and [he] turned on his
overhead emergency equipment, which remained on during the
entire investigation.
3. After talking to the other driver Spencer had defendant get
into the patrol car and again Spencer could smell the same
intensity of marijuana coming from defendant.
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5. After concluding the accident investigation Spencer asked
defendant about the odor of marijuana. Spencer asked
defendant if he had been smoking marijuana and defendant said
no. Spencer asked defendant if defendant had been around
others who smoked marijuana and defendant said some of his
friends smoked marijuana but that he had not smoked any that
day.
6. Spencer asked if there was any marijuana in defendant's
vehicle and defendant said no, there was not. Spencer asked if
he, defendant, minded if Spencer searched defendant's car to
see if there was any marijuana.
7. Spencer did not use any intimidating words or demeanor,
Spencer was the only officer present, no weapons were drawn,
no threats or promises were issued, and the conversation was in
tone and tenor similar to the accident investigation.
(R. 79-86). The trial judge's Conclusions of Law section of the Memorandum Decision
also supports preservation of the issue. The trial judge concluded that,
1. When Spencer asked defendant if he had been smoking
marijuana defendant was then detained. Until that time, though a
reasonable person would not feel free to leave. .. When Spencer
shifted the focus of the investigation to a marijuana inquiry
defendant was detained and not free to leave.
4. The request to search was not issued by Spencer until Spencer
asked if defendant had been smoking marijuana. Defendant
stated no, and in answer to another question defendant stated his
friends had smoked marijuana. That statement was some
corroboration of the odor Spencer smelled. The detection of the
odor does not stand uncorroborated.
(R. 79-86).
Although the aforementioned facts and conclusions of law were ultimately used to
conclude whether the defendant was "seized" for Fourth Amendment purposes, they are
also determinative factors in support of a finding that Spencer was subject to a custodial
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interrogation for Miranda purposes. Even though the Miranda issue was not specifically
raised in the trial court, the claims of error were sufficiently preserved by the questions
posed by defense counsel and the state, as well as the trial judge's Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law. Therefore, this Court should find that the Miranda issue was
sufficiently preserved for appeal.
POINT II. IN THE ALTERNATIVE, THIS COURT MAY STILL
REVIEW THE MIRANDA ISSUE ON APPEAL UNDER THE PLAIN
ERROR DOCTRINE.
"To demonstrate plain error, a defendant must establish that (i) an error exists; (ii)
the error should have been obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the error is harmful, i.e.,
absent the error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome for the
appellant." Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1208-09. "If any one of these requirements is not met,
plain error is not established." Id. "To show obviousness of the error, [a defendant] must
show that the law was clear at the time of trial." State v. Garcia, 2001 UT App 19, \ 6,
19 P.3d 1123 (Utah Ct. App. 2001).
Assuming this Court does not find that the Miranda issue was preserved below, it
should be reviewed under the plain error doctrine. First, as set forth above, an error
occurred where Spencer failed to Mirandize Mr. Parkin before interrogating him while he
was in custody. This error violated law established in Miranda and Carner. The United
States Supreme Court decided Miranda in 1966 and the Utah Supreme Court decided
Carner in 1983. These cases were well established before Mr. Parkin's Motion to
Suppress and Memorandum in Support was argued and denied by the trial court. (R. 41-
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6, 79-86). Therefor, this Court should find that the trial court's failure to rule on the
Miranda violation establishes the first prong of the plain error doctrine, that an error
exists.
Next, the error should have been obvious to the trial court. It is well established
that Miranda arose out of the concern that "coercion inherent in custodial interrogations
unacceptably raises the risk that a suspect's privilege against self-incrimination might be
violated." U.S. v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630, 639 (2004). It is also established that an
interrogation occurs where "any words or actions on the part of the police that the police
should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect."
Innis, 446 U.S. at 301. Utah law establishes that a temporary investigation is not a per se
custodial interrogation, however, "at the point the environment becomes custodial or
accusatory, a police officer's questions must be prefaced with a Miranda warning."
Carner, 664 P.2d at 1169.
The trial court should have been alerted to the error when Spencer testified that
"[A]ny time I smell marijuana, I search the car." (SH:39). At that point the trial court
should have determined that Spencer had reasonable grounds to believe that a crime had
been committed and that Mr. Parkin is the person who committed it. Carner, 664 P.2d at
1171. Based on the foregoing, the second prong of the plain error doctrine is met because
the Miranda violation should have been obvious to the trial court.
Finally, Mr. Parkin must show that without the error, there was a reasonable
likelihood that the case would have been decided differently in the trial court. See State
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v. Mitchell 779 P.2d 116, 1122 (Utah 1989) (the prejudice analysis considers whether
there was a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome below). If the trial court
would have ruled on the Miranda issue it would have found that Mr. Parkin was subject
to a custodial interrogation without the protections of a Miranda warning; therefor it
would have suppressed all statements made by Mr. Parkin. Had the trial court made such
a ruling it would have also found that Mr. Parkin's consent was the result of police
coercion; therefor it would have also granted Mr. Parkin's Motion to Suppress. Without
the physical evidence it is highly likely that the state would have dismissed Mr. Parkin's
case.
POINT III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY FINDING THAT
MR. PARKIN'S CONSENT WAS FREELY AND VOLUNTARILY
GIVEN; THEREFOR THE EVIDENCE SHOULD HAVE BEEN SUPPRESSED.
In the absence of a warrant, when a defendant is subject to police illegality, and
his or her rights are violated, for the subsequent search to be valid it is the state's burden
to prove that the consent to search was (1) voluntary and (2) there was no police
exploitation of a prior illegality. State v. Arroyo, 796 P.2d 684, 687-88 (Utah 1990).
Consent is not voluntary if it is given under duress, coercion or threat. State v. Hansen,
2002 UT 125, 63 P.3d 650, 644-65 (Utah 2002). In addition, consent is not valid when it
is obtained by a police exploitation of a prior illegality. Id. at 665. Such exploitation
exists when the consent is insufficiently attenuated from the illegal seizure. State v.
Godina-Luna, 826 P.2d 652, 655 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). Factors to consider in the
exploitation analysis include temporal proximity of the illegality and consent, the
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presence of intervening circumstances, and the purpose and flagrancy of the official
misconduct. Id. The state must establish that the consent was sufficiently attenuated
from the illegal detention. Id.
A.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY FINDING THAT MR. PARKIN'S
CONSENT WAS FREELY AND VOLUNTARILY GIVEN WITHOUT
COERCION.

In the instant case, no search warrant was issued and Mr. Parkin's consent was not
voluntary because it was given as a result of police coercion. As stated above, Spencer's
coercive and compulsive strategies lead to a conclusion that Mr. Parkin was in custody.
These coercive and compulsive strategies also lead to a conclusion that Spencer coerced
Mr. Parkin into consenting to the search of his vehicle.
It is well settled under the Fourth Amendment and Article I, Section 14 that a
search conducted without a warrant issued upon probable cause is per se unreasonable,
subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, All U.S. 218 (1973). One exception to the warrant
requirement is free and voluntary consent. Id. When consent is relied upon to justify a
warrantless search, the government has the burden of proving that the consent was, in
fact, freely and voluntarily given. Davis v. U.S., 328 U.S. 582, 593-94 (1946). Consent
is not voluntary if it is obtained as "the product of duress or coercion or express or
implied." State v. Bisner, 37 P.3d 1073, 2001 UT 99,147 (Utah 2001). "The
appropriate standard to determine voluntariness is the totality of the circumstances test,
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and the burden of proof is by preponderance of the evidence." State v. Hansen, 2002 UT
atf56.
Factors that may indicate a lack of duress or coercion include: "(1) the absence of
a claim of authority to search by the officers; (2) the absence of an exhibition of force by
the officers; (3) a mere request to search; (4) cooperation by the owner of the [property];
and (5) the absence of deception or trick on the party of the officer." Bisner, 2001 UT at
147.
In the instant case, the trial court erred by finding Mr. Parkin's consent was free of
coercion. The question of whether consent was voluntary is a question of law reviewed
for correctness, giving no deference to the trial court's findings. Bisner, 2001 UT at f 42.
Spencer coerced Mr. Parkin's consent by showing authority, accusing Mr. Parkin of
smoking marijuana and possessing marijuana in his vehicle, and commanding a search so
that he could ensure that there was no marijuana in the vehicle. Spencer specifically
showed authority by commanding to search the vehicle to make sure there was no
marijuana in it after telling Mr. Parkin that he could smell it on his person. (SH:36). And
also by accusing Mr. Parkin of a crime while he was isolated in Spencer's patrol car.
(SH:20,35). Moreover, Spencer asked for consent immediately after accusing Mr. Parkin
of committing crimes. (SH:39).
Although Spencer did not claim that he could search the vehicle without consent;
he also failed to inform Mr. Parkin that he was free to leave or free to decline consent.
(SH:32-33). Thus, while some factors may indicate a lack of coercion a review of the
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totality of the circumstances indicate Spencer used coercion to obtain consent to search.
He showed authority and demanded cooperation by Mr. Parkin. Therefor, the trial court
erred by finding that Mr. Parkin's consent was given voluntary and free of coercion.
B.

THE SEARCH OF MR. PARKIN'S VEHICLE WAS NOT VALID
BECAUSE IT WAS ACCOMPLISHED AS A RESULT OF PRIOR
POLICE ILLEGALITY.

In addition to Mr. Parkin's consent being involuntary it was also obtained through
police exploitation of the prior illegality, specifically the Miranda violation. First, the
temporal proximity between the illegality and the consent occurred simultaneously. Any
consent Mr. Parkin gave occurred while he was in custody and interrogated without a
Miranda warning. Secondly, there were no intervening circumstances that occurred
between the illegal custody and interrogation and the search of Mr. Parkin's vehicle. The
search occurred within minutes of the Miranda violation. (SH:36). Finally, the purpose
and flagrancy of the official misconduct was severe. The purpose of excluding evidence
obtained in violation of a defendant's constitutional rights is to defer future illegalities.
Hansen, 63 P.3d at 665 (the exclusionary rule is "to compel respect for the constitutional
guaranty in the only effectively available way- by removing the incentive to disregard
it") (citing Brown v. Illinois, All U.S. 590, 599-600 (1975)).
In the instant case, Spencer observed Mr. Parkin for approximately thirty minutes
before he started interrogating him. (SH:37). He noticed that Mr. Parkin did not have
glassy, blood shot eyes, and he did not slur his speech. Id. The only reason Spencer
interrogated Mr. Parkin was based on the odor of marijuana. Id. After failing to observe
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any criminal behavior and determining not to cite Mr. Parkin, Spencer should have let
him on his way. (SH:17-18, 35). Instead, Spencer made a conscious decision to
interrogate Mr. Parkin and search his vehicle after obtaining consent. (SH:36). Because
Mr. Parkin's consent to the search of his vehicle was both involuntary and tainted by the
prior police illegality, any evidence obtained as a result of the search should be
suppressed as it is "fruit of the poisonous tree."
While it is clear that the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine has been held to
apply to Fourth Amendment violations, it should be equally obvious that a Fifth
Amendment Miranda violation engaged in by law enforcement, specifically with the
intent to obtain consent to conduct the questioned search, is the very type of prior police
illegality that this Court should and ought to deter, as per Hansen. Mr. Parkin
specifically requests that this Court apply a Hansen exploitation analysis focused on the
Fifth Amendment Miranda violation occurring in this matter as the very police illegality
that should and ought to be deterred.
POINT IV. THE SEARCH OF MR. PARKIN'S VEHICLE WAS INVALID
BECAUSE NO EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES EXISTED.
Under Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution, "[A] warrantless automobile
search requires probable cause and exigent circumstances unless it satisfies traditionally
recognized justifications of protecting the safety of police or the public or preventing the
destruction of evidence." Brake, 103 P.3d at 705 (citing State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 460,
469-70 (Utah 1990); State v. Christensen, 676 P.2d 408,412 (Utah 1984); State v. Limb,
581 P.2d 142, 144 (Utah 1978). Moreover, "[t]he considerations requiring a showing of
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exigent circumstances under the automobile exception seem to apply with equal force to
the search of a vehicle based on an officer detecting the odor of marijuana." State v.
Naisbitt, 827 P.2d 969, 973 n.7 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). "[E]xigent circumstances exist
when the car is movable, the occupants are alerted [to the presence of law enforcement],
and the car's contents may never be found again if a warrant must be obtained."
Anderson, 910 P.2d at 1237.
The search of Mr. Parkin's vehicle was unconstitutional because there were no
exigent circumstances. In State v. Maycock, 947 P.2d 695, 698 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) this
Court held that exigent circumstances existed because: defendant's vehicle was movable,
he was alerted to the officers' presence, if Trooper Swain left to procure a warrant the
defendant could have disposed of the contraband, and Trooper Swain could not access a
magistrate to obtain a telephonic warrant. And in State v. Morck, this Court held that
exigent circumstances justified the warrantless search of the defendants' truck based on
the following facts: the encounter between the defendants and the police occurred close
to midnight on a dirt road in a remote area, a tow-truck was coming to get the truck, the
defendants were not under arrest and could have gone with the tow-truck and removed
any incriminating items. 821 P.2d at 1194. This Court also found that the officers could
not have obtained a telephonic warrant due to location of a pay phone and radio contact.
Id.
The instant case, no exigency existed because Mr. Parkin was the complainant
who called police dispatch and requested an officer to investigate the traffic accident.
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(SH:15). Even though his vehicle was movable and he was alerted to the officer's
presence, there was no exigency because he requested the officer to the scene and
expected him to perform an investigation.
Moreover, there was no threat that the contents would not be found if a warrant
was obtained because Spencer could have easily obtained either a search warrant or a
telephonic warrant. Almost immediately after Spencer arrived at the scene he smelled the
odor of marijuana coming from Mr. Parkin. (SH:16). He did not investigate the odor at
that time although he knew that he would eventually. Id. Spencer testified that "[A]ny
time I smell marijuana, I search the car." (SH:39). Instead, he spent thirty minutes
investigating the accident before inquiring about the odor. (SH:36). Because Spencer
detected the odor when he first arrived he could have attempted to obtain a search
warrant by requesting another officer to take over the traffic accident investigation while
he located a magistrate to issue a warrant based on his sworn affidavit. Or he could have
obtained a telephonic warrant. Spencer did not face any of the problems preventing him
from obtaining a telephonic warrant like the officers in Maycock and Morck. Spencer
was in a residential area in Park City where cell phone coverage is plentiful. And his
radio was working properly, as evidenced by his call to dispatch to send Trooper
Jorgenson to assist in the search. Because he did not attempt to locate a magistrate to
obtain a telephonic warrant it is unknown if one was available; however, it is likely a
magistrate would have been available given that the search occurred on a Monday in the
early evening.
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Therefore, this Court should find that the search of Mr. Parkin's vehicle violated
his rights under Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution where there were no
exigent circumstances justifying the warrantless search. As a result all evidence should
be suppressed as "fruit of the poisonous tree." Moreover, because the trial court failed to
rule on this issue, Mr. Parkin asks this Court to rule on the issue; or in the alternative, to
remand the case to the trial court to make the necessary findings and conclusions.
CONCLUSION
Wherefore Appellant Jason Parkin prays that this Court find that there was a
Miranda violation and suppress his statements; and also find that his consent was
involuntary and obtained as a result of police illegality, therefore suppress the evidence;
and also find that there no exigent circumstances existed and the warrantless search of his
vehicle was in violation of his rights under Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution
therefore suppress the physical evidence as it is "fruit of the poisonous tree."
SUBMITTED this

30th

day of October 2006.

BRENT GOLD
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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ADDENDA

ADDENDUM A

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Plaintiff,
Case No. 041500254
vs.
Honorable BRUCE C. LUBECK
JASON B. PARKIN,
Defendant.
DATE: December 14, 2005
The above matter came before the court for decision an
Defendant's Motion to Suppress.

BACKGROUND
An Information was filed on December 17, 2004, charging
defendant with a Class A misdemeanor offense of possession of
marijuana and a Class A misdemeanor offense of possession of drug
paraphernalia and a third degree felony of possession of cocaine.
After a preliminary hearing held May 3, 2005, the case was bound
over.
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Defendant filed a motion to suppress on August 15, 2005.

An evidentiary hearing was conducted August 22, 2005.

The court

heard the evidence and set a briefing schedule. Oral argument was
scheduled for October 11, 2005, but continued on two occasions by
counsel for various reasons. Argument was heard December 13,
2005, and the court took the matter under advisement and now
issues its ruling.

The court has reviewed the pleadings of the parties, heard
the testimony, reviewed the entire file, and concludes as
follows.
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. On December 6, 2004, defendant was involved in a vehicle
accident on SR 248.

The Utah Highway Patrol was called afterward

and arrived approximately 6:30 p.m.
2. Upon arrival UHP Trooper Spencer (Spencer) encountered
defendant and Spencer immediately detected the odor of raw
marijuana emanating from defendant.
vehicles.

That was outside the

No discussion or comment occurred about that

observation by Spencer.

Defendant did not appear in any way to

be impaired according to the observations of Spencer, either in
speech, appearance, movement or functioning.

Defendant's car was

behind the other vehicle involved in the accident and Spencer was
behind both vehicles and Spencer turned on his overhead emergency
equipment, which remained on during the entire investigation.
3. Spencer conducted the accident investigation and talked
with the other driver and with defendant.

Spencer collected

information, including driver licenses, registration, insurance,
and had defendant and the other driver fill out statements.
After talking to the other driver Spencer had defendant get into
the patrol car and again Spencer could smell the same intensity
of raw marijuana smell coming from defendant.
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Defendant was in

the vehicle approximately ten minutes, most of which was involved
in concluding the accident investigation.
4. Spencer did not cite defendant for the accident but cited
the other driver.
5. After concluding the accident investigation Spencer asked
defendant about the odor of marijuana.

Spencer asked defendant

if he had been smoking marijuana and defendant said no.

Spencer

asked defendant if defendant had been around others who smoked
marijuana and defendant said some of his friends smoked marijuana
but that he had not smoked any that day.
6. Spencer asked if there was any marijuana in defendant's
vehicle and defendant said no, there was not.

Spencer asked if

he, defendant, minded if Spencer searched defendant's car to see
if there was any marijuana.

Defendant said Spencer could look.

The request to search came within one minute of asking about the
odor of marijuana.
7. Spencer did not tell defendant he could deny permission
to search.

Spencer did not use any intimidating words or

demeanor, Spencer was the only officer present, no weapons were
drawn, no threats or promises were issued, and the conversation
was in tone and tenor similar to the accident investigation that
had been on-going for approximately 30 minutes.
7. Spencer looked in the car and found items of drug
paraphernalia and arrested defendant and placed defendant in the
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police vehicle.
8. The vehicle was impounded and an inventory search was
conducted and it revealed the items that are the subject of this
motion.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Defendant was involved in a consensual encounter until
the conclusion of the accident investigation.

Law enforcement

had been called to investigate an accident scene.
investigation was not a detention.

The accident

When Spencer asked defendant

if he had been smoking marijuana defendant was then detained.
Until that time, though a reasonable person would not feel free
to leave, while the accident investigation was on-going the
encounter was consensual because law enforcement had been invited
to participate, that is, investigate the accident. When Spencer
shifted the focus of the investigation to a marijuana inquiry
defendant was detained and was not free to leave.

At that point

the encounter was not consensual.
2. The detention, to be lawful, must be supported by
reasonable suspicion.

The investigation must be tailored to last

no longer than is necessary to either confirm or dispel the
suspicion. The scope of the investigation must be related to the
nature and degree of the suspicion.
3. The odor of a controlled substance, raw marijuana, known
to trained law enforcement officers normally, emanating from
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defendant amounts to reasonable suspicion to question whether the
person had marijuana and justifies a request for permission to
conduct a search.

When an officer smells raw marijuana he is

entitled to, and would be derelict to fail to, inquire about the
source of the odor.

Defendant argues that if there was an odor

about the area the office should have investigated that first and
Spencer's explanation about the odor is obviously not credible
because Spencer did not undertake the controlled substance
investigation until after the accident investigation.

The court

cannot and does not second guess an officer as to the
reasonableness of his investigative methods.

If there was

reasonable suspicion that justified a temporary detention to
investigate the odor or marijuana, the order in which such
investigation occurs is not relevant.
4. The detention was reasonable because there was reasonable
articulable suspicion to justify it.

The odor of marijuana

amounted to a suspicion that justified the further detention and
the questions about use and the request to search.

The scope of

the investigation was short, limited directly to inquiry about
the source of the odor and a request to search. The request to
search was not issued by Spencer until Spencer asked if defendant
had been smoking marijuana.

Defendant stated no, and in answer

to another question defendant stated his friends had smoked
marijuana. That statement was some corroboration of the odor
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Spencer smelled.
uncorroborated.

The detection of the odor does not stand
Further, even without such corroboration, the

court concludes the detection of the odor of marijuana, by
itself, by a trained officer, while not amounting to probable
cause, does amount to reasonable suspicion that justifies a
request to search a vehicle.
5. Defendant was detained after the accident was fully
investigated for a very brief time, under three minutes, until
the consent was sought and obtained.
6. The consent was freely and voluntarily given and is not
attacked other than as to being tainted by the alleged illegal
detention. There was a clear and unequivocal request to search
the vehicle by Spencer and a clear and unequivocal response by
defendant that Spencer could search in the vehicle. Spencer
stated by his question he believed drugs were in the vehicle.
7. There was no duress or coercion, express or implied, in
the conduct of Spencer.
8. The totality of the circumstances show the consent was
freely and voluntarily given without coercion.

There was no

illegal detention that tainted the consent. The validity of the
consent is not challenged in terms of voluntariness but it is
said to be tainted by the illegal detention. The court has found
and concluded there was no illegal detention.
9. The search and resulting seizure of contraband was lawful
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under the Fourth Amendment and Article I, section 14 of the Utah
Constitution.

The motion to suppress is DENIED.

This Ruling and Order is the Order of the court and no other
order is required.

The clerk of the court is to place this case on the criminal
calendar for a status conference and the setting of a trial date.

DATED th is
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ADDENDUM B

CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES

Amendment IV
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

Amendment V
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a
presentment or indictment of a grand jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval
forces, or in the militia, when in actual service in time of war or public danger; nor shall
any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor
shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be
taken for public use, without just compensation.

UTAH CONSTITUTION
Article I, Section 14
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue but
upon probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, particularly describing the place to
be searched, and the person or thing to be seized.

